Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/14782103231157158

This contribution begins by reviewing a widespread inherited idea in Western civilisations: that education is an undertaking to be controlled, at least in all essentials, by some superior body; not by educational practitioners. As a subordinate practice then, and depending on the political, religious or ideological colour of the controlling body’s outlook, education may be called upon to serve widely different purposes, often conflicting ones. Against this historical pattern I propose the notion of education not as a subordinate practice but as a practice in its own right, with demands that arise from its own inherent purposes. Despite being overshadowed by institutionalised forces in the history of Western education, the philosophical ancestry of education as a practice in its own right is robust and energetic. It reaches back beyond Plato and Aristotle to the example of Socrates, specifically the practical Socrates captured in the early dialogues of Plato. In supporting the case for education as a practice in its own right, I will explore the kinds of experience that lie at the heart of the practice and the character of the kinds of fruit that flow from it. These features distinguish education from other practices and from deficient forms of educational practice itself. Arising from this exploration, an analysis will be carried out of the capabilities and relationships that constitute educational practice, as the particular kind of practice that it is.